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In this paper we provide evidence that there are statistical and economically meaningful
differences in terms of attitudes towards risk at the aggregate level across countries,
as captured by country-specific estimations of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
This has important implications for fiscal policy as it leads to large differences in the
output response to the same fiscal policy shock. When calibrating the risk aversion
at the country level, using country-specific estimates of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, we find multipliers to the same fiscal consolidation shock to differ as much as
between 0.35 and 0.55.
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1 Introduction
After the financial crisis of 2008, many European countries dealt with great national debts. As a
result, several countries started advancing debt reduction plans, either through reduction in govern-
ment spending, increasing taxation, or both. This event revitalized the role of fiscal consolidation
programs, following a rekindled interest in fiscal policy and fiscal multipliers (see Blanchard &
Leigh (2013) and Alesina et al. (2015)). Fiscal multipliers are not uniform across countries and
time periods, since they depend on the type of fiscal instruments, country characteristics, and eco-
nomic situation. The sensitivity of different microeconomics variables on fiscal multipliers has been
studied in recent papers.
The classes of models used to perform cross-country comparisons of fiscal multipliers, as in
Brinca et al. (2016) and Brinca et al. (2020), use preferences where attitudes towards risk are pinned
down by the coefficient of relative risk aversion and are held constant across countries. However, we
provide evidence that attitudes towards risk vary significantly across countries and these differences
can imply meaningful differences in output responses to the same fiscal shock. Gandelman &
Hernández-Murillo (2015) estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion, employing a constant
relative risk aversion utility function, for which the elasticity of the marginal utility of income
related to income coincides to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. They find that coefficients
of relative risk aversion, when estimated at the country level, have statistic and economically
meaningful differences. Each risk aversion coefficient shows the rapidity of the marginal utility of
income to decline as income rises. When the elasticity of marginal utility of income increases, the
marginal utility of income drops faster, if income goes up, impacting negatively on consumption
and positively on savings.
In our mechanism, the coefficients of risk aversion affect the output response to a fiscal shock,
because they positively impact savings and negatively affect the level of agents constrained. When
the fiscal shock hits, for less constrained agents, labor supply falls by more, and output drops are
larger. Agents increase savings, because of precautionary motives and therefore, there is a lower %
of credit-constrained agents, who are more affected from both fiscal consolidation programs.
To obtain these results, we employ the overlapping generations model introduced in Brinca et al.
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(2016) and in Brinca et al. (2020), which is a model with exogenous credit constraints, heterogeneous
agents, incomplete markets, uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and a bequest motive. We first calibrate
the model to Germany, our benchmark economy, using different risk aversion coefficients. We find
that increasing risk aversion, boosts savings and reduces the amount of individuals constrained in
the economy. Moreover, there is a solid negative relationship between the share of credit-constrained
and the fiscal multipliers. Therefore, Germany shows that increasing relative risk aversion leads to
higher fiscal multipliers in absolute values, both for a cut in government spending, and an increase
in taxes on labor income.
Additionally, we consolidate the robustness of our results, comparing Germany directly with
Greece, which has a higher level of risk aversion, and a lower percentage of credit-constrained
agents. The results show that the dimension of fiscal multipliers is larger for Greece than Germany,
explaining the mechanism, and confirming our previous findings.
Finally, to study whether the relationship between the risk aversion parameter and the fiscal
multiplier is robust enough to hold when considering several header country characteristics, we
realize a multi-country experiment where we calibrate our model to match an extensive range of
country-specific data moments for a sample of 10 European countries1. Calibrating the model for
each country, we study how each economy responds to a gradual reduction in government debt,
obtained by reducing government spending or increasing labor income taxes.
Our cross-country experiment confirms the negative relationship between fiscal multipliers and
the percentage of constrained agents in the economy, as figure 4 shows. The Spearman correla-
tion between the fiscal multipliers obtained with our model and the risk aversion is 72.1%, when
considering an austerity-based consolidation, and -66.6% when considering a taxation one. These
results show the relationship between risk and the fiscal multipliers holds, even when considering
country-specific data moments.
The paper’s organization is the following: it begins with the introduction of recent relevant literature
in section 2. Section 3 contains a description of the overlapping generations model and the intuition
beyond risk aversion, we delineate the competitive equilibrium, and describe the fiscal consolidation
1The 10 European countries are Austria (AUT), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Greece (GRE), Ice-
land(ICE), Italy (ITA), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Spain (ESP), and Sweden (SWE).
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exercises. Section 4 details the calibration of the model. Section 5 assesses the empirical relationship
between coefficient of risk aversion and the fiscal multipliers correlated with fiscal consolidations,
followed by the cross-country analysis in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This work connects two different areas of the economic literature: fiscal policy and risk aversion.
First, there is a vast part of literature that studies the size and the impact of fiscal consoli-
dation programs, particularly after the 2008 crisis. Blanchard & Leigh (2013) and Blanchard &
Leigh (2014) discover that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not consider crucial fac-
tors in assessing fiscal multipliers and this brought to the underestimation of their impact across
European countries after the Great Recession. Consequently, Alesina et al. (2015) find tax-based
consolidations aggravate the size of recessions more than austerity-based ones. According to them,
the first ones are much more expensive in terms of loss of output, since it produces wider and
more protracted recessions. Romei (2015) adds the importance of the architecture of fiscal con-
solidations, confirming the relevance of doing it rapidly and by cutting public expenditure. Other
relevant country characteristics, such as the size of openness, the level of development and the
exchange rate impact fiscal multipliers, as Ilzetzki et al. (2013) show. They state the fiscal effect
is more prominent in developed countries that operate at a fixed exchange rate. Pappa et al.
(2015) examine how shocks in fiscal consolidation are connected with corruption and tax evasion,
identifying a connection between tax rising and production in the shadow economy. They also
find the production falls if economies have significantly lower productivity. Anderson et al. (2016)
show fiscal programs have heterogeneous effects on agents, according to age and income level. The
most similar paper to ours is Brinca et al. (2020), where it is shown a positive correlation between
labor share and fiscal multipliers. For the same purpose, Bernardino (2019) discovers the higher
is the impact multiplier, the greater is the share of financially constrained agents in the economy.
This is a consequence of agents with credit constraints, who have a higher marginal propensity to
consume. Similarly, Brinca et al. (2016) emphasize greater wealth inequality is related to more
substantial expansionary impacts of increases in government expenditures, since a larger share of
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constrained agents leads to more wealth inequality. Also Brinca et al. (2019a) identify a robust
positive correlation between output losses and income inequality, following a fiscal consolidation
shock. When income inequality leads to preventive savings behavior, it reduces the share of agents
with credit constraints. Given that agents with credit constraints do not react to the future fluc-
tuations in income, the smaller is the participation of these individuals in the economy, the larger
is the production loss. Furthermore, Brinca et al. (2019b) demonstrate the response of output to a
shock of government spending is not linear, and fiscal multipliers increase with the shock.
Second, there is a vast literature that tries to find an ordinary estimator for the risk aversion
parameter. Risk attitudes control many economic variables, as precautionary savings, consumption,
and hours worked. Even if many economists tried to measure different risk aversion coefficients,
there is no standard estimator used in the literature. The parameter that has been used more
often in economic research lies between 0 and 5. In the 1980’s, the most systematic method
to estimate risk aversion was focused on a consumption-based capital asset pricing model, and for
example, Hansen & Singleton (1982) used the generalized method of moments to find risk aversion is
relatively tiny. Neely et al. (2001) (2001), find CAPM fails estimating them, given the impossibility
in forecasting consumption growth. The study of Gandelman & Hernández-Murillo (2015) is the
most relevant to simplify the coefficient of risk aversion in a single parameter that can be used in
macroeconomic models. They follow Layard et al. (2008), using happiness data to estimate how
quickly the marginal utility of income falls when income increases, with a maximum likelihood
estimation. They assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, for which the
elasticity of the marginal utility of income, with respect to income, coincides to the parameter
of relative risk aversion. Gandelman & Hernández-Murillo (2015) do the same, but using the
generalized method of moments (GMM) to perform the estimation. They use surveys of personal
well-being from the Gallup World Poll. There are many reasons why their study is one of the
most relevant. This is the starting point for the study of cross-country variations in risk aversion
and their association with several economic parameters. Using the same methodology different
times for 75 countries is a valid proof to assess the robustness of the estimates. Using GMM, their
estimations provide asymptotically correct standard errors for these coefficients. Macroeconomic
models, as the one we present in section 3, are usually based on calibrated coefficients of relative
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risk aversion, and it is difficult to find them for several countries. However, we demonstrate using
country specific coefficients is economically and statistical significant in the model.
It is relevant to mention Gandelman & Hernández-Murillo (2015) find consistent risk aversion
estimators around 0 and 3. In particular, for most of the countries, it is between 0.5 and 1.5. This
is significantly useful, because a coefficient closer to 0 represents a linear utility function in terms
of income, while a coefficient of 1 a logarithmic one. All the countries we use in our experiments
are part of this last category, and this means they will follow the log utility function’s behavior.
When it has the value of 1, income and substitution effects, completely cancel out. When it is very
close to 1, the effects are weak.
3 The Model
This section describes the model employed to examine the fiscal consolidation shocks. It is analogous
to the one presented in Brinca et al. (2019a), an OLG model with partial uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk, and with incomplete markets, that considers heterogeneous agents and has a bequest motive
as in Brinca et al. (2019a)
3.1 Preferences and Relative Risk Aversion
An individual who has an utility of consumption function denoted U(c) and positive, but dimin-





where RRA is a positive number, since the second derivative is negative in the numerator: a higher
value of RRA shows a higher level of risk aversion. For each household U(c, n), the model employs
a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. Utility of agents is declining in working
hours, n ∈ (0, 1], expanding in consumption, c, and assumes the following CRRA representation,









In the above equation, χ represents the disutility from work, η the inverse Frisch labor elasticity,
and σ the risk aversion parameter. Households take decisions on how many hours to work, n,
how much to consume, c, and how much to save, k’. Retired households do not supply labor, but
receive a social security payment, ψt. For retired households, the utility function is extended with
the amount of bequest they leave to future living generations when they die:
D(h′) = φlog(h′) (3)
3.1.1 Intuition Beyond the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
As said, σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. If two individuals have different CRRA utility
functions, the one with a higher value of σ is more risk averse. An individual with a higher level of
σ has a lower level of certainty equivalent wealth, thus, he is willing to pay a higher risk premium
in order to exchange the risky wealth for its expected value.
In inter-temporal choice problems of individuals, the elasticity of (inter-temporal) substitution




is relevant, because it includes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution: ǫu(c) =
1
σ
. If σ = 1 the substitution effect and the income effect on savings exactly offset. When σ increases,
there are 2 effects with the same directions. It increases the level of precautionary savings, that
occur in case of increasing uncertainty about future income. The precautionary reason for delaying
consumption and saving in the current period increases due to the absence of completeness in the
insurance markets. Consequently, agents cannot insure themselves versus any bad state of the
economy in the future. They predict that if this bad state occurs, they will earn less. To avoid the
negative effects of fluctuations in future revenues and maintain a regular consumption pattern, they
constitute a preventive reserve, called preventive savings, decreasing consumption in the present,
to use it in the event of a bad state in the following period. The second effect is that since σ also
represents how fast the marginal utility of income declines as income increases, when the elasticity
of marginal utility of income increases, the marginal utility of income declines faster, reducing
consumption and increasing, again, savings.
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3.2 Technology
For the model it has been used a standard assumption of a representative firm that manufactures
output, with the following Cobb - Douglas production function:





where the input of labor is Lt, using efficiency units, and the input of capital is Kt, in period t.
The capital evolves as following:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (5)
where It represents the investment in period t and δ stands for depreciation rate of capital stock




Πt = Yt − [wtLt + (rt + δ)Kt] (6)
The wage per efficient unit of labor, wt, corresponds to the marginal product of labor inside a





















There are J overlapping generations of household in the economy. Let j define their age. They start
their life at 20 year’s old and enter retirement at 65 year’s old. After households’ retirement, they
experience a probability of death π(j) that depends on age, and they certainly die when they are 100
year’s old. Each period lasts 1 year, thus in the economy exist 45 time life periods of active work.
The size of population is fixed over time. The survival probability is defined as w(j) = 1 − π(j),
thus Ωj =
∏q=J−1
q=65 ω(q) represents retired agents of age j ≥ 65 still alive. A portion of households
leave unintended bequests, defined by Γ (per-household bequest), since annuity markets do not
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exist. These bequests are redistributed with a lump-sum, between agents still alive. Furthermore,
government provides a subsidy, Ψ, to each retired household.
Families are constrained to several persistent, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, asset holdings,
permanent ability and a discount factor, β ∈ (β1, β2, β3), that is arranged across agents, uniformly.
Each household realizes his permanent ability at birth that follows a normal distribution with zero
mean, α ∼ N(0, σ2α).
3.4 Labor Income
The wage of every individual is based on their personal characteristics: j, age, permanent ability,
a ∼ N(0, σ2a), and idiosyncratic productivity shock, u, which follows an AR(1) process:
ut+1 = ρut + ǫt+1, ǫ ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ) (9)
where ρ represents the persistence of the idiosyncratic shock and these characteristics define the
amount of labor efficient units that the household possess. Moreover, individual wages depends on
the wage per efficiency unit of labor w, and can be represented by:
wi(j, a, u) = we
γ1j+γ2j2+γ3j3+a+u (10)
where γ1, γ2, γ3 represent the wages age profile.
3.5 Government
The social security system in managed by the government in an equilibrated way, balancing tax
rates for the employer and the employees, defined respectively by τ̃ss and τss, and benefits paid to
retirees, Ψt. In order to finance spending on pure public consumption goods, Gt, the government has
the duty to tax capital, consumption, and labor income. Expenditures on pure public consumption
goods Gt, interest payment on the national debt, rBt, and the lump sum redistribution, gt, are
considered separable in the utility function and are financed by the government through taxes on
consumption (τc), labor (τl) and capital (τk) income. The government uses flat rates on τc and
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τk, whereas the labour income tax follows a non-linear functional form as in Benabou (2002) and
Heathcote et al. (2020):
τl(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1 (11)
where y is the pre-tax labour income, τl(y) stands for the average tax rate given the pre-tax
income of y. θ0 and θ1 represent respectively the level and progressivity of the tax schedule
1. The














with Rss being the social security revenues, R the revenues from the taxes collected on labor and
Tt the other tax revenues.
3.6 Household Problem
We need to define a recursive formulation of the household problem. In any given period the agent
is endowed with specific characteristics, defined by the vector (k, β, a, u, j) where j is the age of
the household, k represents savings of households, β ∈ {β1, β2 β3} stand as discount factor of time,
a as the permanent ability, and u as a persistent idiosyncratic productivity shock.
Therefore, the household problem can be formulated in the following recursive form:
V (k, β, α, u, j) = max
c,n,k′
[
U(c, n) + βEu′
[
V (j + 1, k′, β, α, u′)
]]
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ = (k + Γ)(1 + r(1− τk)) + g + Y
L
n ∈ [0, 1] , k′ ≥ −b, c > 0
where Y L is the labour income of the household after deductions, b is the borrowing limit. τss and
τ̃ss are social security taxes that are paid by the employee and the employer. A retired household
1A more extensive discussion about this tax function is provided in Appendix 9.1.
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has an optimization problem that is close to that of an active one, apart from the fact that it does
not supply any labor, receives annual retiree benefits and is characterized by the age dependent
probability of dying π(J). It gains an utility of D(k′), from leaving a bequest. The household’s
optimization problem can be defined as follows:
V (k, β, j) = max
c,h′
[
U(c, n) + β(1− π(j))V (j + 1, k′, β) + π(j)D(k′)
]
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ = (k + Γ)(1 + r(1− τk) + g +Ψ
k′ ≥ −0, c > 0
3.7 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
In the equilibrium, markets clear, budgets balance, and agents optimize their choices given prices.
We define φ(k, β, a, u, j) as measure of households with the corresponding characteristics and the
recursive competitive equilibrium in the following way:
1. The household’s optimization problem is solved dynamically through the function V (k, β, a, u, j)








n(k, β, a, u, j)dΦ,
∫
cdΦ+ δK +G = KαL1−α
3. The factor prices satisfy:
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3.8 Transition and Fiscal Experiments
The fiscal consolidation experiments are similar to the ones of Brinca et al. (2019a). The economy
starts from an initial situation of steady-state. The government, without previous announcement2,
decreases the sovereign debt-to-output ratio, By, by 10% of GDP, during the course of 50 periods.
Two different policies are applied to obtain this contraction: for all agents, a reduction of the
government spending, G, by 0.2% of the steady-state GDP every period, or a rise of the labor
income tax, τl, by 0.1% of the steady-state GDP every period. After 50 periods of consolidation,
the government spending or the labor tax return to the starting level. The economy needs 50 periods
more to converge to the new steady-state equilibrium, now with a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.3
The difference with the stationary equilibrium is that for the dynamic-programming problem
of households time, t, is needed to capture all the changes in policy and price variables relevant in
this maximization problem, along to the transition to the lower debt-to-GDP steady state. This
method is similar to the one used in Brinca et al. (2016) and Krusell & Smith (1998): the numerical
solution is achieved by guessing paths for all the variables that will depend on time and then solving
the maximization problem backward, after the guess is updated.
2Brinca et al. (2019a) find that anticipated fiscal consolidations do not have a statistically significant
negative effect on output, while unanticipated consolidations do.
3The definition of a transition equilibrium following the fiscal experiment is in appendix 9.2.
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3.9 Definition of the Fiscal Multiplier
The impact and cumulative multiplier are delineated as in Brinca et al. (2019a). We define fiscal
multiplier as the net present value of the sum of all variations in output divided by the same period
variations in the fiscal instrument. Consequently, the impact multiplier is the ratio of the variation
of output to the fiscal instrument’s change when the initial shock is realized. We consider the
two multipliers separately. The first one comes from government expenditure. The second one
from taxation. Considering the fiscal consolidation episode via government spending, the impact
multiplier can be defined as:




where ∆Y is the adjustment of output from period 0 to period 1 and ∆G1 is the adjustment in
government spending from period 0 to period 1. The corresponding cumulative multiplier, at time
T, is:
















The fiscal consolidation episode via taxation, has a different impact multiplier that can be
defined as:




where ∆Y is the adjustment of output from period 0 to period 1 and ∆R1 is the adjustment in
revenues of government from period 0 to period 1. The related cumulative multiplier, at time T,
is:

















The model described in the previous section is calibrated to the German economy, with the same
methodology of Brinca et al. (2016) and Brinca et al. (2019a). We choose Germany as a benchmark
economy because it is the largest economy in Europe. Some parameters are calibrated exogenously,
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because they have straight theoretical or empirical correspondents. Tables 14 and 16 show the
exogenous calibration for the whole set of countries. A simulated method of moments (SMM) is
then used to calibrate all the remaining factors endogenously and table 15 lists the related results.
The identical calibration strategy is then applied for the multi-country experiment, keeping constant
the coefficients detailed in table 13.
4.1 Wages
For the estimation of the age profile of wages, (see equation 20), data of the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) was used to run this regression for all the countries:
ln(wi) = ln(w) + γ1j + γ2j
2 + γ3j
3 + ǫi, (20)
where j is the age of individual i and w is the wage rate of equation 7. The coefficient for the variance
of ability, σa, is fixed between countries, corresponding to the average of σa for the European
countries in Brinca et al. (2016). ρ is set equal to the amount used in Brinca et al. (2016), who
employ U.S. data that come from PSID4. As in Brinca et al. (2019a) the variance of the idiosyncratic
income risk, σǫ, is calibrated to make the model match the variance of log wages according to the
one choosen above.
4.2 Preferences and Borrowing Limit
The value of the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η, was strongly discussed in the literature.
We follow Trabandt & Uhlig (2011) and Guner et al. (2016), setting it as 1. Seven values, χ, that
governs the disutility of working an additional hour, φ, that controls the utility of leaving bequests,
the discount factors β ∈ {β1, β2 β3} and the borrowing limit, b, are calibrated endogenously so that
the model output matches the data5.
4Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
5The corresponding data moments are average yearly hours, taken from the OECD Economic Outlook,
the ratio of capital to output, K/Y, taken from the Penn World Table 8.0, three wealth moments taken from
the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), namely the shares of wealth held by those between the 1st and 25th
percentile, between the 1st and 50th percentile and between the 1st and 75th percentile and the mean wealth
held by those aged 75 to 80 relative to mean wealth in the whole population, from LWS.
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4.3 Taxes and Social Security
We utilize the previously described labor income tax function (equation 11, proposed by Benabou
(2002)) and estimate tax income level and progressivity parameters, respectively θ0 and θ1, using
the OECD’s labor income tax data for families. The weighted average over the population of θ0 and
θ1 are computed for different individuals, depending on their marriage status and on the amount of
children. Social security parameters, τ̃ss and τss, are obtained from OECD Tax Data and τc and τk
come from Trabandt & Uhlig (2011). Table 16 summarizes all tax data for the sample of countries.
4.4 Parameters calibrated endogenously using SMM
We employ the simulated methods of moments to calibrate parameters that do not have an empirical
counterpart. This method is used to estimate ψ, β1, β2, β3, b, σǫ and χ, minimizing the following
loss function between moments from the model, Mm, and moments observed in the data, Md:
L(ψ, β1, β2, β3, b, σǫ, χ) = ||Mm −Md|| (21)
In our experiment, we endogenously calibrate the before mentioned seven parameters. For this, we
need 7 target data moments to obtain a carefully identified system. The selected data moments,
listed in table 14, are identical to Brinca et al. (2019a): the three quartiles of the cumulative net
wealth distribution, Q25, Q50, Q75, the average fraction of yearly hours worked, n̄, the capital-to-
output ratio, K/Y , the variance of the natural logarithm of wages, V ar(lnw). Table 4 shows the
endogenously calibrated parameters and the related calibration errors for Germany, the benchmark
economy, while table 14 presents the parameters calibrated endogenously and the corresponding
calibration errors for the cross-country experiment. We fit each targeted data moments to a high
level of precision, since we obtain an average value across countries of the loss function of 1.45.
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5 Quantitative Results
This section illustrates the simulations undertaken, each experiment’s result and the significative
relationship between the risk aversion coefficient and the fiscal consolidation programs. First, we
use Germany as the benchmark nation to assess the empirical relationship between coefficients of
relative risk aversion and fiscal multipliers. Second, we compare Germany and Greece to explain
the mechanisms behind cumulative multipliers and to robust the first results. Third, we simulate a
multi-country exercise to see if the empirical relation is valid, even when including several different
country characteristics.
5.1 Fiscal Consolidation Programs: Explaining the Mechanism
To investigate the relationship between risk aversion and fiscal multipliers, it is useful to understand
the meaning of σ in paragraph 3.1.1: it is relevant to notice the inverse relationship between σ and
savings6, and its negative impact on labor supply7.
Following the fiscal experiment described in the previous section, the economy begins from the
steady-state and the government declares a contraction of the sovereign debt-to-output ratio by
10% over 50 periods, without previous announcement. For both fiscal consolidation programs, the
government pays its debt, reducing the amount of government bonds available in the economy and
driving families to transfer their savings towards physical capital. This shift in savings rises the
capital-to-labor ratio. The marginal productivity of labor increases, with the rise of capital per
worker. Market clearing conditions suggest that labor’s marginal productivity matches the wage
rate8, thus output and wages rise to a larger amount in the long-run, progressively. Since wages
increase gradually, workers’ expected income during life-time increases. Consequently, labor supply
and output drop in the short-run. The consolidation via labor income taxes, τl, works in a different
way: after rising the tax rate, workers’ after-tax income drops and this decreases the opportunity
cost of leisure. Consequently, labor supply and output decline more in the short-run.
6For empirical documentation of this fact, see Oduncu (2012).
7As documented in Chetty (2005).
8See equation 7 inside the model.
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5.2 Fiscal Multipliers and Risk Aversion
We find that there is an empirical relationship between risk aversion parameters and fiscal multipli-
ers. Using the model presented in chapter 3, we increase the risk aversion parameters for Germany,
the benchmark economy, to estimate the sensibility of changing risk aversion coefficient on aggre-
gate variables that determine the fiscal multiplier. We need to re-calibrate the model, every time
we change the risk coefficient, to match the initial moments, in order to isolate its effects and to
keep the loss function (eq. 21) close or below one, since, to ensure that this experiment is accurate,
the average percentage deviation from the data has to be very low.9
Risk Aversion Germany Fiscal Multipliers 0.77 0.97 1.2 1.4
GDP per Capita 0.5809 0.5134 0.5030 0.4870
Average individual earnings 0.4463 0.4046 0.3964 0.3838
Gamma Redistribution 0.0256 0.0208 0.0183 0.0173
Lump Sum 0.0855 0.0781 0.0762 0.074
Capital-labor ratio 5.812 5.254 5.187 4.902
% Agents Constrained 4.81 3.99 3.36 2.82
Table 1: Effects of changing risk aversion on relevant parameters.
Table 1 contains the main divergences for Germany when the calibration is performed considering
different risk aversion parameters10.
This experiment related to Germany confirms literature assumptions. Figure 1 shows that, in-
creasing risk aversion of agents, boosts savings, reduces consumption and decreases the speed of
the economy. The two turning points are in coincidence with the change in risk aversion level.
First, it is relevant to underline that, when calibrating, we need to adjust χ, the disutility of work,
proportionally with the changing of σ, as expected from equation 2. Due to the higher risk aversion
of agents, the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to income is higher, and this
is inversely related to consumption and labor supply. The level of income is lower and so is the
capital. The marginal productivity of capital is negative correlated with risk aversion, and when
this increases, there is less capital circulating. As known in literature, the marginal productivity
9In particular following the order of the columns in the table, L = 0.9174, L = 2.1820, L = 0.4238, L =
1.9778, e.g. the error of our result is minimized. For the full calibrations of Germany check tables 4,6,8,10.
10The first column of table 1 follows the empirical estimation of σ of Gandelman & Hernández-Murillo
(2015)11, while the second one is calculated following the risk preference study of l’Haridon & Vieider (2019).
For more details, see Appendix 10.
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Figure 1: Fiscal Multiplier Benchmark Economy. The values have been normalized to assess the percentage variation.
of labor, and therefore GDP per capita, are positively associated to the capital-labor ratio, thus
they both are lower with higher values of risk aversion. Higher risk aversion increases savings and
decreases the percentage of agents constrained in the economy; since there is less capital circu-
lating, this contributes to the contraction of average individual earnings, and has a final impact
on GDP per capita, slowing down generally the economy. A lower level of risk aversion has the
opposite result and this seems to have a multiplicative effect. In fact, from literature we know that
a coefficient of 0 implies a linear utility function, while a coefficient of 1 implies a logarithmic utility
function in terms of income. The more the parameter is close to zero, the faster the multiplier goes
and the economy goes better; the closer it is to 1, the worst it goes. However, our finding is that
once it gets higher than 1, the recessive impact reduces itself, being consistent with Gandelman &
Hernández-Murillo (2015).
5.3 Impact Multipliers and Risk Aversion
Risk aversion influences also impact multipliers. Their definitions can be found inside paragraph
3.9. The difference with the previous chapter is that we do not only change the risk level, but
we also apply the transition and the fiscal experiments studied in 9.2. Table 2 shows the different
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Figure 2: Impact Multipliers Benchmark Economy.
values of the impact multipliers in the case of Germany. Incrementing risk aversion leads to a rise
in the impact multiplier from 0.4503 to 0.5348. This can be explained by the impact on labor
supply and savings. Increasing the normal level of risk, leads households to exceed the certainty-
equivalent level of saving, due to precautionary motive. If households are more risk-averse the
marginal utility of income declines faster with respect to income: they increase their precautionary
savings, protecting from eventual future declines in income. This culminates into a lower share of
credit-constrained agents. Labor supply is less rigid, and both labor and output drop further.
Risk Aversion Germany Impact Multipliers 0.77 0.97 1.2
Multiplier G 0.4503 0.4839 0.5348
Multiplier t -0.521 -0.918 -1.869
Table 2: Impact Multipliers for the benchmark economy.
5.4 Fiscal Consolidation Programs in Germany and Greece
To illustrate the significance of heterogeneity in risk aversion across countries, the impact of consol-
idation in Germany and in Greece was firstly compared, because they have opposite economic indi-
cators and different level of risk aversion. In Greece the calibrated share of constrained households
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is 3.42%, while Germany shows a larger percentage of constrained agents, 4.81%. Furthermore,
the calibrated disutility from work in Germany is 9.6, while in Greece is 15.4. We apply to both
the economies the transition and fiscal experiment studied in chapter 3.8 and the results show that
the cumulative multiplier is higher in Greece than in Germany. In Figure 3 we plot the output,
labor supply and consumption output multiplier of the two countries for the government spending
fiscal program, that are significantly larger in the Greek economy, where the level or risk aversion
is higher. This reinforces the robustness of our previous results.
Figure 3: Government spending consolidation: Output cumulative multiplier (left panel), Labor Supply cumulative multiplier
(middle panel) and Consumption cumulative multiplier (right panel) in the first three periods in Germany (dashed line) and
Greece (solid line).
6 Cross-country Analysis
Section 5 shows the empirical relationship between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and fiscal
multipliers, as a result of changing relative risk aversion. The present section shows that it holds and
is relevant quantitatively, considering different country-specific data moments, developing a cross-
country analysis. To do that, we calibrate the model presented in chapter 3 to match an extensive
range of several country characteristics, where we match data, not only on the distribution of risk
aversion, but also on government debt, taxes, income and wealth.
11For the full calibrations and loss functions, see table 16.
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Figure 4: The y-axis considers the percentage share of agents constrained for each country and in the x axis the relative risk
aversion. The Spearman correlation is -0.68 and the p-value of 0.001
.
Figure 5: Impact multipliers and Risk Aversion. The consolidation through government spending for the cross-country
experiment has Spearman correlation coefficient 0.72106 and p-value 0.121
.
Figure 5 and 6 reveal that our model can recreate the cross-country empirical relationship
between risk aversion and impact multipliers: countries with higher risk aversion suffer larger
output drops for both fiscal consolidation programs. These results are statistical and economically
relevant. Figure 4 shows the inverse relationship between risk aversion and the % of constrained
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households for the cross-country experiment, that explains our mechanism.
Figure 6: Impact multipliers and risk aversion. The consolidation through labor taxation in the cross-country experiment has
Spearman correlation coefficient -0.66601 and p-value 0.0368).
The Spearman correlations between the impact multipliers and relative risk aversion are 72% for
austerity-based programs, while they are -66% when considering a consolidation via taxation. We
conclude that it is possible to assess the cross-country correlation between both fiscal consolidation
programs and relative risk aversion, even when introducing country characteristics and high level
of heterogeneity. Furthermore, and in accordance to literature (Alesina et al. (2015) and Brinca
et al. (2019a)), consolidations that are obtained increasing labor income taxes generate more severe
recessions than austerity-based consolidations. Table 17 displays that the fiscal multiplier is on
average 2.385 times larger for the 10 European countries examined, when the consolidation is
done through taxation. As seen in the previous experiments, countries with greater risk aversion,
exhibit a smaller level of credit-constrained agents and a less rigid labor supply that generates more




This paper assesses how risk aversion influences the mechanisms behind fiscal consolidation pro-
grams. The work is motivated by the fact that risk aversion coefficients, when estimated at the
country level, have statistic and economically meaningful differences. We provide evidence that
this heterogeneity across countries implies meaningful differences in output responses to the same
fiscal shock.
First, calibrating an overlapping generations model to a benchmark economy, under different
risk aversion coefficients, we obtain that a higher level of risk aversion increases savings due to
precautionary motives, leading to a lower share of credit-constrained agents. Thus, when the fiscal
consolidation shock hits, the size of labor supply and output drops are larger than otherwise.
Second, we compare Germany, a country for which the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
lower, to Greece, that has a higher level of risk aversion. Quantitative results show that Greece has
a lower level of constrained agents, thus it suffers more the recessive impact of fiscal consolidation
programs, with a larger drop both in labor supply and output.
Furthermore, the multi-country exercise shows the relation between risk aversion coefficients
and impact multipliers across 10 European countries. Representing how each economy performs,
after a not announced debt reduction program, financed through a decrease in government spending
or, in alternative, an increase in labor income taxation, we find that impact multipliers are overall
higher for economies with higher risk aversion, in absolute values.
Overall, this study is relevant to assess the significance of relative risk aversion on fiscal consoli-
dation programs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the level of uncertainty increased dramatically,





8.1 Germany Data - Calibrations for the 2 countries experiment
Data Moment Description Source Target Model Value
ā75−80/ā Mean wealth age 75-80 / mean wealth LWS 1 1
n̄ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.190 0.191
Var ln(w) Variance of log wages LIS 0.354 0.406
K/Y Ratio between capital and output PWT 3.013 3.023
Q25, Q50, Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.036;0.179;0.179 0.035;0.042;0.1735
Table 3: Calibration Fit - Germany with σ = 0.77
Parameters Description Value
ψ Bequest utility 0.908
β1, β2, β3 Discount factors
0.940;0,993
0.966
b Borrowing limit 0.02
χ Disutility from work 9.9599
σǫ Variance of Risk 0.498
Table 4: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously - Germany with σ = 0.77
Data Moment Description Source Target Model Value
ā75−80/ā Mean wealth age 75-80 / mean wealth LWS 1 1.03
n̄ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.190 0.190
Var ln(w) Variance of log wages LIS 0.354 0.406
K/Y Ratio between capital and output PWT 3.013 3.0392
Q25, Q50, Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.0036;0.179;0.179 0.0047;0.0423;0.168
Table 5: Calibration Fit - Germany with σ = 0.97
Parameters Description Value
ψ Bequest utility 0.908
β1, β2, β3 Discount factors
0.94498;0,998993
0.96677
b Borrowing limit 0.02
χ Disutility from work 12.8999
σǫ Variance of Risk 0.498
Table 6: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously - Germany with σ = 0.97
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Data Moment Description Source Target Model Value
ā75−80/ā Mean wealth age 75-80 / mean wealth LWS 1 1
n̄ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.190 0.190
Var ln(w) Variance of log wages LIS 0.354 0.406
K/Y Ratio between capital and output PWT 3.013 3.013
Q25, Q50, Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.036;0.179;0.179 -0.0029;0.0257;0.1747
Table 7: Calibration Fit - Germany with σ = 1.2
Parameters Description Value
ψ Bequest utility 0.908
β1, β2, β3 Discount factors
0.9298;1.00433
0.97377
b Borrowing limit 0.09
χ Disutility from work 17.319
σǫ Variance of Risk 0.49861
Table 8: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously - Germany Calibration Fit - Germany with σ = 1.2
Data Moment Description Source Target Model Value
ā75−80/ā Mean wealth age 75-80 / mean wealth LWS 1 1
n̄ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.190 0.189
Var ln(w) Variance of log wages LIS 0.354 0.406
K/Y Ratio between capital and output PWT 3.013 2.9
Q25, Q50, Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.036;0.179;0.179 -0.0018;0.0288;0.1920
Table 9: Calibration Fit - Germany with σ = 1.4
Parameters Description Value
ψ Bequest utility 0.645
β1, β2, β3 Discount factors
0.9298;1.00433
0.97377
b Borrowing limit 0.09
χ Disutility from work 22.108
σǫ Variance of Risk 0.49861
Table 10: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously - Germany Calibration Fit - Germany with σ = 1.4
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Data Moment Description Source Target Model Value
ā75−80/ā Mean wealth age 75-80 / mean wealth LWS 1 0.992
n̄ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.230 0.230
Var ln(w) Variance of log wages LIS 0.22 0.22
K/Y Ratio between capital and output PWT 3.262 3.262
Q25, Q50, Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.0111;0.1250;0.3667 0.0116;0.1112;0.3735
Table 11: Calibration Fit - Greece
Parameters Description Value
ψ Bequest utility 0.730
β1, β2, β3 Discount factors 0.9952;0.9971;0.9777
b Borrowing limit 0
χ Disutility from work 15.4
σǫ Variance of Risk 0.120
Table 12: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously - Greece
8.2 Cross Country data and Calibrations
Table 13: Parameters held constant across countries
Parameters Description Value Source
δ Depreciation of rate of capital 0.06 Literature
ρ Persistence in equation 0.335 Estimated with PSID 1968-1977
σa Variance of the ability 0.423 Brinca et al. (2016)
η Inverse Frisch Elasticity 1 Trabandt & Uhlig (2011)
Table 14: Country-specific Calibration targets
Country Q1 Q2 Q3 K/Y η̄ Var(lnw)
Austria -0.001 0.022 0.186 3.359 0.226 0.174
France 0.0010 0.0539 0.2616 3.392 0.184 0.478
Germany -0.0036 0.0273 0.1788 3.013 0.189 0.354
Greece 0.011 0.125 0.367 3.262 0.23 0.22
Iceland 0.005 0.077 0.276 4.334 0.308 0.249
Italy 0.0086 0.1025 0.3237 3.943 0.2 0.225
Portugal 0.0058 0.0821 0.2660 3.229 0.249 0.298
Spain 0.0175 0.1289 0.3417 3.378 0.183 0.225
Slovakia 0.0546 0.2069 0.4495 3.799 0.204 0.250
Sweden -0.099 -0.078 0.115 2.155 0.233 0.315
1 2 3
1Macro ratios: K/Y comes from Penn World Table 8.0, average of 1990-2011 period; B/Y stands for the
average of net public debt in 2001/2008 (IMF);
2Labor targets: η̄ is hours worked per capita taken by OECD data, average of 1990-2011; Var(lnw) and
g1; g2; g3 are from LIS survey available before 2008. Data from Portugal are taken by from Quadros de
Pessoal 2009 database;
3Q1, Q2 and Q3 stand for the three quartiles of the cumulative distribution of net wealth, from LWS;
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Table 15: Parameters calibrated endogenously using risk aversion estimators specific across countries, L corresponds to the
Loss function value in equation 21
Country β1 β2 β3 b χ φ σǫ L
Austria 0.8543 1.00936 0.98146 -0.08 13.51 1.14 0.18046 0.8189
France 0.97442 1.0291 0.9992 0.23 24.6 0.558 0.5067 2.0423
Germany 0.94098 0.99313 0.96677 0.02 9.9599 0.908 0.498 0.9174
Greece 0.99552 0.9971 0.9777 0 15.4 0.731 0.120 0.9185
Iceland 0.97245 1.00185 0.972659 0.08 5.743 2.45 0.294 1.4812
Italy 1.0023 1.02575 0.9948 0 24.1 0.225 0.3746 1.3469
Portugal 0.9620 0.9960 0.9715 0 10.60 1.4899 0.3796 0.9024
Spain 0.98599 1.0040 0.981 0 20.47 1.4 0.2366 2.8791
Slovakia 0.98480 0.99016 0.99025 0 12.35 2.15 0.3261 0.9480
Sweden 0.9736 0.9516 0.917 0.35 9.055 0.71 0.41067 2.312
Table 16: Parameters calibrated exogenously and Country-specific Calibration targets
Age Profile Parameters Taxes Macro ratios
Country γ1 γ2 γ3 θ0 θ1 τ̃ss τss τc τk K/Y B/Y
Austria 0.155 -0.004 3.0e-05 0.939 0.187 0.217 0.181 0.196 0.240 3.359 0.432
France 0.384 -0.008 6.0e-05 0.915 0.142 0.434 0.135 0.183 0.355 3.392 0.559
Germany -0.176 0.003 2.3e-05 0.881 0.221 0.206 0.210 0.155 0.233 3.013 0.489
Greece 0.120 -0.002 1.3e-05 1.062 0.201 0.280 0.160 0.154 0.160 3.262 1.038
Iceland 0.161 -0.003 1.9e-05 0.868 0.204 0.055 0.000 0.253 0.200 4.334 0.213
Italy 0.114 -0.002 1.4e-05 0.897 0.180 0.329 0.092 0.145 0.340 3.943 0.893
Portugal 0.172 -0.004 2.6e-05 0.937 0.136 0.238 0.110 0.194 0.293 3.229 0.557
Spain 0.114 -0.002 1.4e-05 0.904 0.148 0.305 0.064 0.144 0.296 3.378 0.368
Slovakia 0.096 -0.002 1.7e-05 0.974 0.105 0.326 0.131 0.181 0.151 3.799 0.317
Sweden -0.021 0.001 -1.2e-05 0.796 0.223 0.326 0.070 0.255 0.409 2.155 -0.034
1 3 4
Table 17: Cross-country Impact Multipliers for the model calibrated with relative risk aversion
Country Calibrated σ Loss Fun. K/Y Multiplier G Multiplier τl |Multiplier τl| / |Multiplier G|
Austria 1.08 0.8189 3.441 0.4717 -1.215 2.576
France 1.43 2.0423 3.392 0.5521 -1.417 2.566
Germany 0.77 0.9174 3.013 0.4503 -0.521 1.164
Greece 1.08 0.9185 3.262 0.5509 -0.941 1.708
Iceland 0.62 1.4812 4.333 0.3401 -0.837 2.461
Italy 1.31 1.3469 3.872 0.521 -1.227 2.417
Portugal 1.07 0.9024 3.233 0.4503 -1.055 2.343
Spain 1.01 2.8791 3.477 0.4771 -1.132 2.372
Slovakia 0.83 0.9480 3.747 0.4926 -1.165 2.365
Sweden 1.16 2.312 2.154 0.5727 -2.125 3.710
Average 1.036 1.456 3.392 0.4878 -1.1635 2.385
1γ1, γ2, γ3 are obtained from equation 20, employing LIS survey accessible before 2008. Data for Portugal
are from Quadros de Pessoal 2009 database;
3τ̃ss and τss represent the average taxes for social security with OECD data of 2001-2007;




Given the tax function12
ya = θ0y
1−θ1
which we employ, the average tax rate is defined as
ya = (1− τ(y))y
thus,
θ0y
1−θ1 = (1− τ(y))y
which implies:
(1− τ(y)) = θ0y
−θ1
τ(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1
T (y) = τ(y)y = y − θ0y
1−θ1
T ′(y) = 1− (1− θ1)θ0y
−θ1








and thus independent of the parameter θ0. In this manner, one can raise average taxes by lowering
θ0 and not the progressivity of the tax code, since the parameter θ1 uniquely determines the
progressivity.
12This appendix is borrowed from Brinca et al. (2019a).
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9.2 Definition of a Transition Equilibrium After the Unantici-
pated Fiscal Consolidation Shock
A recursive competitive equilibrium along the transition between steady states is defined as: Given
the capital stock present at the beginning, the initial distribution of households and initial taxes,
respectivelyK0, Φ0 and {τl, τc, τk, τss, τ̃ss}
t=∞
t=1 , a competitive equilibrium in a sequence of individual









t=1 , government transfers, {gt,Ψt, Gt}
t=∞
t=1 , government debt, {Bt}
t=∞
t=1 , inheritance
from the dead, {Γt}
t=∞
t=1 , and of measures, {Φt}
t=∞
t=1 , such that for all t:
1. The consumers’ optimization problem is solved by the value function V (k, b, a, u, j) and the








(nt(kt, β, a, u, j))dΦt (23)
∫





3. The factor prices satisfy:
















dΦt +Gt + rtBt =
∫ (





dΦt + (Bt+1 −Bt)
(27)


















7. Aggregate law of motion:
Φt+1 = γt(Φt) (30)
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10 APPENDIX C
Micro Data and Estimation
Gandelman & Hernández-Murillo (2015) cross country estimators .
Gandelman & Hernández-Murillo (2015) estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion for several
countries with happiness data from the Gallup World Poll. Layard et al. (2008) already used
happiness data to estimate the how fast the marginal utility of income falls when income rises
with an iterated maximum likelihood procedure and with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function. WIth this CRRA per-period utility function with time-separable preferences, σ is
also the reciprocal of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS). The form of the Constant









if σ 6= 1
log(y) if σ = 1
(31)
In order to calculate the utility function Gandelman and Hernandez-Murillo (2014) used a sample
to give a value to the happiness of people from 0 to 10. The mean of this value has been calculated
as 5.5 using a scale from 0 to 10 scale for the overall sample. There have been used also control
variables. The sample contains adult people that have an average age of 42.4 years. More women
participated (55.6 percent) than men (44.4 percent). In general, more people were married or
formed a couple, with the 69.1 percent, while the single were the 30.9 percent. The 44.6 percent of
these individuals live in a city. The 59.9 percent were employed during the period of the research.
l’Haridon & Vieider (2019) Risk Preferences Estimations .
Table 18: Data country by country l’Haridon & Vieider (2019)
Country Sub.s For.s age male econ math natural hum arts social language GDP Gini
Czech R. 99 2 22.38 0.606 0.485 0.111 0.051 0.121 0.030 0.091 Czech 25,949 .310
France 93 8 21.30 0.527 0.430 0.054 0.022 0.043 0.032 0.032 French 35,194 .327
United Kingdom 80 0 20.77 0.450 0.700 0.000 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.075 English 36,511 .350
Germany 130 32 26.52 0.515 0.115 0.400 0.108 0.115 0.008 0.023 German 39,414 .270
Spain 80 3 20.94 0.513 0.450 0.037 0.000 0.100 0.037 0.225 Spanish 32,701 .320
